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Preparing	British	foreign	policy	for	the	post-Brexit
era:	why	swift	and	sudden	institutional	change	is	not
the	answer
A	policy	vision	backed	up	by	energetic	leadership	and	greater	investment	will	do	more	to
strengthen	the	institutions	of	UK	foreign	policy	than	hastily	introduced	institutional	changes,
explains	Nicholas	Wright.
Having	successfully	navigated	the	general	election	and	with	Britain’s	formal	withdrawal	from	the
EU	just	a	matter	of	days	away,	Boris	Johnson	is	believed	to	be	considering	major	structural
changes	to	the	machinery	of	government.	The	rationale	–	and	temptation	–	is	obvious:	at	the
same	time	as	refashioning	the	bureaucratic	and	administrative	structures	that	must	deliver	his	manifesto	promises,
he	can	stamp	his	authority	in	perhaps	the	most	eye-catching	way	available	to	a	Prime	Minister.	Consequently,
several	departments	–	most	notably	the	Department	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	(DExEU)	–	are	rumoured	to	be
facing	the	axe.
The	ministries	responsible	for	Britain’s	foreign	policy	are	no	exception	and	perhaps	inevitably	the	Department	for
International	Development	(DfID)	is	one	of	those	under	the	spotlight.	Long	a	target	of	those	critical	of	Britain’s	aid
policy,	it	has	been	suggested	–	most	recently	by	the	former	International	Trade	Secretary,	Dr	Liam	Fox	–	that	DfID
should	be	brought	back	into	the	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	(FCO),	responsible	for	overseas	development
aid	until	1997	when	DfID	was	established	by	the	first	Blair	government.
In	a	recent	speech	at	the	Institute	for	Government,	Fox	criticised	the	long-term	degradation	of	the	FCO’s
capabilities	as	a	consequence	of	significant	cuts	imposed	by	the	Treasury	under	both	Conservative	and	Labour
administrations.	These	have	seen	the	FCO’s	budget	fall	dramatically	over	the	last	three	decades,	leaving	it
increasingly	‘hollowed	out’	in	its	analytical	and	diplomatic	capacity.	By	contrast,	today	DfID,	with	its	statutory
responsibility	to	meet	the	government’s	target	of	spending	0.7%	of	GDP	on	overseas	aid,	has	a	budget	around	five
times	that	of	the	FCO.	His	logic	is	that	returning	this	to	the	control	of	the	FCO	would	hugely	increase	its	financial
clout	and	international	influence.
Fox	also	argued	that	the	UK	has	room	for	‘only	one	foreign	policy,	not	two’.	This	echoes	the	long-held	belief	in
some	quarters	that	both	DfID’s	operations	and	what	it	represents	amount	to	a	rival	foreign	policy	that	weakens	or
even	undermines	Britain’s	wider	foreign	policy	objectives.	His	claim	–	made	previously	by	others	including	Boris
Johnson	–	is	that	merging	the	two	departments	would	resolve	this	tension	by	re-establishing	a	single	focal	point	for
British	foreign	policy.	In	short,	losing	DfID	would	kill	two	birds	with	one	stone.
However,	although	Fox’s	critique	of	the	failure	of	successive	governments	to	invest	sufficiently	in	the	FCO	and	the
UK’s	diplomatic	capabilities	is	persuasive	and	supported	by	frequent	parliamentary	inquiries,	his	proposed	solution
–	a	major	institutional	reorganisation	–	is	not.	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	for	this,	of	which	the	three	outlined
below	are	arguably	of	most	importance.
1.	 Foreign	policy	is	not	the	sole	preserve	of	the	FCO
While	the	FCO	remains	central	to	the	development	and	pursuit	of	UK	foreign	policy	and	the	management	of	its
diplomatic	network,	it	is	not	the	only	institution	which	matters.	For	example,	it	works	closely	and	effectively	with	the
Ministry	of	Defence	and/or	DfID	to	tackle	a	range	of	issues	around	defence	and	security.	Indeed,	all	three	played	a
leading	role	in	establishing	the	cross-government	Stabilisation	Unit	which	is	tasked	with	developing	and
implementing	comprehensive	approaches	to	international	stability	and	conflict	prevention	and	which	has	become	a
model	for	other	states.	But	in	broader	questions	of	economics,	international	trade,	climate	change	etc.,	other
departments,	such	as	the	Department	for	International	Trade,	also	play	important	and	ongoing	roles,	while	the
Prime	Minister	is	a	key	arbiter	on	the	most	important	questions.
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This	reminds	us	that	UK	foreign	policy	has	many	sources.	For	it	to	be	developed	and	enacted	effectively,	what
matters	is	the	capacity	of	government	to	coordinate	and	agree	policy	positions	that	can	then	be	pursued	coherently
and	with	a	singularity	of	purpose	at	the	international	level.	The	FCO	plays	a	critical	role	in	this	both	in	London	and
across	the	UK’s	global	diplomatic	network,	but	it	cannot	operate	alone.	Indeed,	the	fact	that	other	departments	can
feed	effectively	into	the	policy	process	whilst	bringing	different	perspectives	is	arguably	one	of	the	great	strengths	of
the	British	system.
2.	 Institutional	change	is	highly	complex
The	creation	or	abolition	of	departments	is	a	high-profile	way	for	governments	to	signal	change	and	a	new	direction.
The	establishment	of	DExEU	and	the	the	Department	for	International	Trade	in	2016	following	the	Brexit	vote	are
prime	examples	of	this.	However,	it	is	one	thing	to	decide	to	restructure	the	machinery	of	government	and	quite
another	to	enact	it.	It	takes	time	for	new	departments	to	build	up	human	capacity	and	expertise,	for	ministerial	vision
to	be	translated	into	detailed	policy	and	implemented,	and	for	results	to	be	seen.	And	yet,	as	a	2019	Institute	for
Government	report	warned,	‘changes	are	frequently	made	with	little	consultation	or	recognition	of	the	costs
involved’.	This	is	not	to	say	that	institutional	change	should	not	happen.	Rather,	there	needs	to	be	a	clearly	and
properly	thought	through	case	for	change	and	a	strategy	for	ensuring	it	is	implemented	as	efficiently	as	possible.
With	the	government	about	to	embark	on	its	promised	‘thorough	and	careful	review	of	the	UK’s	place	in	the	world’,
an	opportunity	now	exists	to	look	at	all	aspects	of	UK	foreign	policy	and	how	it	is	implemented.	In	the	case	of	DfID,
that	should	include	a	consideration	of	whether	the	supposed	advantages	of	bringing	its	responsibilities	and	budget
back	within	the	purview	of	the	FCO	would	outweigh	the	challenges.	These	include	the	task	of	merging	two
institutions	with	different	cultures	and	focuses;	how	long	the	process	of	integration	would	take	and	what	resources	it
would	require;	and	the	potential	negative	consequences	of	DfID’s	abolition.	Andrew	Mitchell,	a	former	International
Development	Secretary,	has	described	it	as	‘a	huge	soft	power	asset’,	and	it	has	certainly	been	an	important	tool	for
British	influence	internationally.	At	a	time	when	the	FCO’s	bandwidth	will	be	taken	up	with	expanding	and
strengthening	Britain’s	engagement	with	the	wider	world	post-Brexit,	the	government	would	need	to	be	absolutely
certain	that	the	upheaval	such	a	change	entails	will	be	worthwhile.
3.	 There	is	no	substitute	for	investment,	strategic	clarity,	and	leadership
While	it	would	be	overly	simplistic	to	say	the	solution	to	the	challenges	faced	by	the	FCO	today	is	money,	the	reality
is	that	a	significant	boost	to	its	budget	(and	not	just	in	the	short	term)	is	essential	if	the	UK	is	to	have	an	effective
foreign	policy	in	the	coming	years.	For	more	than	two	decades,	the	FCO	has	sought	to	do	more	with	less	but	that
will	have	to	change.	If	the	government	is	serious	about	pursuing	a	policy	of	‘Global	Britain’,	greater	investment	is
needed	in	the	FCO’s	analytical	capacity,	its	expertise,	and	in	the		UK’s	wider	diplomatic	network.	In	relative	terms
the	UK	has	been	punching	above	its	weight	internationally	for	many	years	and	its	multilateral	memberships	–
including	of	the	EU	–	have	helped	it	do	so.	Outside	the	EU,	we	have	to	start	spending	more	to	ensure	our	voice	is
heard.
Allied	to	this	is	the	need	for	strategic	clarity	over	our	international	priorities.	For	example,	our	status	as	a	permanent
member	of	the	UN	Security	Council	brings	influence	but	also	significant	responsibilities,	as	does	our	NATO
membership	and	the	commitment	this	entails	to	our	allies.	These	obligations	cost	money,	of	course,	but	also	require
us	to	match	our	rhetoric	with	action.	Ultimately,	this	comes	down	to	leadership	and	vision,	not	areas	where	the	UK
has	been	especially	effective	internationally	in	recent	years.	If	the	UK	wishes	to	retain	its	relevance	–	and,	as
pledged	in	the	Conservative	manifesto,	‘bolster	the	alliances	and	institutions	that	help	project	our	influence	and
keep	us	safe’	–	we	need	to	determine	what	kind	of	international	power	we	wish	to	be	as	well	as	ensuring	sufficient
resources	to	make	this	a	reality.
Conclusion
In	many	respects,	the	challenges	outlined	above	are	not	new:	when	it	comes	to	developing	and	implementing	our
foreign	policy,	how	and	on	what	do	we	spend	our	money,	and	how	do	we	organise	to	best	effect?	There	is	a	clear
and	obvious	case	for	an	increase	in	the	FCO’s	budget.	To	accompany	this,	though,	clear	and	effective	political
leadership	is	essential.	Whatever	the	appeal,	institutional	change	does	not	offer	a	real	alternative	to	these.	Indeed,
the	risk	is	that	it	may	cause	more	problems	than	it	solves.	It	is	not	a	path	to	be	embarked	upon	lightly.
________________
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